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Abstract 
This essay highlights an important lacuna within critiques of infantilizing (neo) colonial 
European discourses: the failure to question whom or what was the ‘child’ against which 
non-Europeans were gauged. The premise is that the unacknowledged figure at the heart 
of these critiques is in fact the figure of the universalized European child. Not only is this 
paradoxical, it also opens the potential for taking these critiques further, and for shifting 
the analytical lens away from the racialized, infantilized Other in order to challenge the 
assumed universality of European notions of childhood against which the Other was, and 
sometimes remains, positioned. We develop this critique through a sympathetic 
engagement with broader postcolonial writings on the subject of infantilization and, 
specifically, with Dipesh Chakrabarty's Provincializing Europe (2000). The essay reveals the 
paradoxical presence of the figure of the European child within Chakrabarty's critique of 
Eurocentrism, arguing that this figure is present even as Chakrabarty seeks to provincialize 
Europe. The essay explores examples of the work that the figure of the universal European 
child continues to perform and concludes with some reflections on what it might mean to 
provincialize the European child, both for postcolonial theory and for the broader ethical 
issues this raises. 
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Introduction 
“Anthropologists taught that primitive societies represented cultural stages that fell 
short of the complete civilization exemplified by the societies of western Europe. In 
the phylogeny of the human race the nineteenth-century savage, together with his 
prehistoric forebear, was assigned the role of child” (Russett 1989: 51–2). 
Critiques of the negative representations of colonized peoples as indolent children in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European colonial discourses are by now familiar. As 
the quote from Russett suggests, infantilizing non-Europeans formed part of the process of 
defining the Other, which in turn resonated with evolutionary theories of human 
development, and linear notions of progress and modernity, placing Europe at the apogee. 
Anticolonial movements and postcolonial nation-building saw concerted attempts by 
colonized and newly independent peoples to assert their agency and challenge the 
infantilism accorded them by colonialism. Despite this, allusions to infantilism persist in 
popular western discourses and neocolonial imaginaries, with representations in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century art and literature (see, for example, Gilman 1985; 
McClintock 1995; McEwan 2000; Said 1978; Stoler 1995) continuing to resonate within 
contemporary geopolitics and development (Baaz 2005; Burman 1995; Holland 1992; 
McEwan 2009). 
While critiques have exposed and problematized infantilizing (neo)colonial discourses and 
the ways in which they are imbued in contemporary power relations, this essay seeks to 
highlight what we consider to be an important lacuna within these critiques. Specifically, 
we suggest that the question of whom or what was the ‘child’ against which non-
Europeans were (and sometimes still are) gauged remains unproblematized in these 
critiques and that this is itself an implicit, if unintended, form of Eurocentrism. The premise 
of the essay is that the unacknowledged figure at the heart of these critiques is in fact the 
figure of the universalized European child. The failure to recognize the presence of this 
figure does not necessarily diminish existing critiques of infantilization in European 
(neo)colonial discourses, since these critiques have been significant in highlighting and 
challenging modes of representation of colonized and formerly colonized ‘Others’. Rather, 
we argue that this represents a paradox, but also opens the potential for taking these 
critiques further, and for shifting the analytical lens away from the racialized, infantilized 
Other in order to challenge the assumed universality of European notions of childhood 
against which the Other was positioned. We develop this critique through a sympathetic 
engagement with broader postcolonial writings on the subject of infantilization and, more 
specifically, with Dipesh Chakrabarty's Provincializing Europe (2000). 
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Chakrabarty's thesis is arguably one of the most powerful and persuasive critiques of 
Eurocentrism through its careful dismantling of universalizing European norms. The central 
thrust of Provincializing Europe is to reposition Europe as one centre among many in the 
production of knowledge forms, rather than occupying a central position in the generation 
of theory and knowledge. As McEwan (2009: 72) argues, this is not intended as a rejection 
of western knowledge, its universalisms and its grand theories (and for this reason 
Chakrabarty has been criticized by more trenchant writers on Eurocentrism: see Ismail 
2005; Gidwani 2008). Nor is it a call for cultural relativism or a notion that all forms of 
knowledge are equally valid. Rather, it requires the positioning of European knowledges 
within their historical contexts and challenging any tendency to universalize from these 
particularities. There is no doubting the significance and influence of Chakrabarty's thesis, 
and its call to decentre European notions of modernity and linear narratives of progress. 
For this reason, the fact that the figure of the European child remains a haunting presence 
within Provincializing Europe is, we argue, an important paradox. We suggest that 
revealing this paradox opens up the need to provincialize the European child that is 
positioned, undeconstructed and unproblematized, within Chakrabarty's and other 
critiques of colonial and neocolonial discourse. Moreover, we argue that the figure of the 
European child is not singular, but rather draws on multiple ideas of childhood that bear 
the burden of different European inheritances. 
In what follows we briefly discuss critiques of colonial discourse in order to illustrate 
further the unacknowledged presence of the figure of the universal European child within 
these critiques. We engage with historiography of childhood in the colonial world, and 
specifically in India, as a means of demonstrating that childhood was not simply an idea 
exported from the colonial metropole, but rather ‘an unstable element produced by a 
wider set of colonial conversations’ (Sen 2005: 4). The essay then explores the paradoxical 
status of the figure of the European child within Chakrabarty's critique of Eurocentrism. 
The final part of the essay takes up this paradox to ask this question: who is this child and 
what might it mean to provincialize the European child, both for postcolonial theory and 
for the broader ethical issues that this might raise? 
Infantilism within Colonial and Neocolonial Discourses 
The implications of infantilizing colonial discourses are clear. If colonized peoples were 
perceived as permanently childlike, then it could be argued that it was natural and just that 
the more ‘advanced’ nations should become permanent guardians. If these childlike 
peoples were incapable of exploiting 
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their own resources, European countries were justified in governing and developing these 
places themselves. As Blaut argues:  
“Non-Europeans … were seen as psychically undeveloped, as more or less childlike. 
But given the psychic unity of mankind, non-Europeans could of course be brought to 
adulthood, to rationality, to modernity, through a set of learning experiences, mainly 
colonial.” (Blaut 1993: 96; see also Broks 1990; Nandy 1987) 
The image of infantilism was thus, to a certain extent, used to legitimate colonialism and 
imperialism under the guise of paternalism and trusteeship. If the perceived 
responsibilities of the European powers were strongly paternal, however, they also had 
implications for unequal power relations. The preference for strong British rule in Africa in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, for example, sprang not only from notions 
about savagery, but also from ideas of infantilism and the general incompetence of the 
non-white inhabitants of the continent. It was intimated that the ‘simple nature’ of 
Africans, their ‘child-like essence’, did not ‘permit them to function well in the complexities 
of the modern world and predisposed them to insanity’ (Gilman 1985: 140). The extension 
of empire and ‘civilization’ was perceived as a duty for Britain: it was the ‘white man's 
burden’ to control and enlighten. As Cairns (1965: 95) argued, the child analogy was useful 
to Europeans for it denied to the colonized the privileges reserved for adults. It both 
reflected and strengthened the idea that non-European cultures did not represent 
worthwhile achievements and were ‘too loosely formed and inchoate to offer any 
significant resistance to an inrush of westernization’. The analogy also acted as a ‘sanction 
and preparation for white control’ (Cairns 1965: 95), since it implied a paternalism that 
denied the colonized the right of deciding on their own future. 
These ideas revealed how colonialism rested on a core contradiction between these 
discourses of otherness, which needed to fix the Other as always, irrevocably different, but 
was justified as a civilizing mission that rested on the possibility that the Other could be 
redeemed and become ‘just like us’. Colonial discourses were characterized by an ‘ironic 
compromise of mimicry’ based on a desire for a reformed, recognizable Other (Bhabha 
1994: 86). The colonized should become like the colonizer but, simultaneously, remain 
different – ‘almost the same, but not quite’. This apparent contradiction was a critical 
element in legitimating colonial expansion and in constituting the ‘white man's burden’ to 
civilize the Other. It also provided a justification for continued economic and geopolitical 
interventions in the name of postcolonial development. Thus, from the late 1940s into the 
1970s, mainstream global economic theory articulated a discourse of ‘lack’ – the idea that 
the former colonies were deficient, should develop by modernizing and should follow the 
same trajectories as western economies in order to  
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‘catch up’, in terms of both economy and ‘civilization’. The metaphor of unruly children 
being brought to adulthood through the guidance of paternalistic guardians was strongly 
implied in these narratives and arguably still frames the way in which global relations are 
often understood through western eyes (Power 2003; Baaz 2005). 
What is striking about many of the explications of (neo)colonial discourses is the extent to 
which, in critiquing infantilization, the construction of the European child as the marker 
against which non-European others were and sometimes still are compared remains 
unproblematized. Elizabeth Gagen (2007) is one of few writers who turn a critical gaze on 
the construction of the universalized European child within colonial discourses. In the 
context of US imperial discourses, she argues that theories of child development were 
interwoven with ideas about foreign underdevelopment, informing not only US imperial 
projects, but also its thinking about itself by universally barbarizing children everywhere. 
Theories of human development drew on psychology, evolutionary biology and 
international relations to conceptualize child development. Thus, ‘in the necessary 
hierarchicization of ‘racial’ development, childhood emerged as universally inferior, 
regardless of race’ (Gagen 2007: 16). Ideas about ‘underdevelopment’ were both spatial 
and temporal and not only relegated overseas places and peoples to a premodern state, 
but simultaneously placed ‘all children – American, European and Non-Western – in a 
universal state of primitiveness’ (Gagen 2007: 17). 
Gagen's point (drawing on Aitken 2001) about this discursive reduction is that whether the 
child is seen as inherently wild, evil, angelic, vulnerably innocent or incapably noble, 
violence is done to the competence and agency of children and their right to be valued in 
their own terms. While critiques of colonial discourse are concerned with the violence 
done to colonized peoples through infantilizing discourses, they do not reflect on the 
violence that is done to the child through these same discourses. Thus Gagen 
demonstrates how theories of child development and notions of foreign 
underdevelopment were interwoven. However, in making these important observations, it 
is not Gagen's intention to problematize the fact that the idea of childhood was essentially 
based on universalizing the European child. As the ensuing discussion illustrates, this is a 
familiar omission. Even critiques that have as their intention the decentring of European 
universalisms, such as Chakrabarty's Provincializing Europe, still leave the figure of the 
European child unacknowledged and unproblematized. This is notable not least because, 
as we discuss further below, there is a long history of colonial elites actively shaping their 
own binaries between child and adult, and appropriating, contesting or attempting to 
decolonize the figure of the European child. 
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Universals, Figuring and Historicism: Framing the European Child in Provincializing 
Europe 
Provincializing Europe is itself a response to a problem: how to write a history of modern 
South Asia and simultaneously engage with questions of ‘political modernity’? Chakrabarty 
provides two reasons as to why this is problematic. First, the term ‘political modernity’, like 
so many others, ‘bear[s] the burden of European thought and history’ (Chakrabarty 2000: 
4). To answer a question formulated with reference to such terms is to be confined within 
its premises and to take on something of the ‘weightiness’ of the burden of those words. 
Second, this is a problem for Chakrabarty specifically, since he identifies as a member of 
the modern Bengali educated middle classes, characterized as the ‘first Asian social group 
of any size whose mental world was transformed through its interactions with the West’ 
(Raychaudhuri 1988, in Chakrabarty 2000: 4). As Chakrabarty argues, he himself has 
inherited universalizing concepts and something of the vision of the human these concepts 
entail. This engagement with universals is indispensable in his task of writing history, as 
European thought itself provided a foundation for critiques of European projects of 
colonization that ‘den[ied] its own vision of man’ (Djait 1985, in Chakrabarty 2000: 5). Yet 
at the same time as engaging with universals, it is precisely the apparent non-universality 
of ‘European thought’ that makes it ‘inadequate in helping us to think through the various 
life practices that constitute the political and the historical in India’ (Chakrabarty 2000: 6). 
For Chakrabarty, as discussed previously, the postcolonial challenge to provincialize Europe 
is not to negate the value of universalisms – human rights, citizenship and democracy – 
since these have been fundamental to the formation of independent postcolonial nations. 
Rather, it is to recognize that European models of development and modernity cannot 
easily be universalized, and that alternative ideas about the nature of human rights and 
citizenship may, in fact, emerge from places like India. 
One of the universals ‘forged in eighteenth-century Europe’ with which Chakrabarty 
frequently engages is the ‘abstract figure of the human … that underlie[s] the human 
sciences’ (Chakrabarty 2000: 5). Chakrabarty's use of ‘the figure of’ points to a process of 
abstraction, or ‘figuring’. This figuring allows for an unknown person, or body, to be 
recognized as one instance of a group by their likeness to a set of already known and 
essentialized characteristics (Ahmed 2000: 3). It is these characteristics and the various 
‘signs’ by which they can be recognized that give shape to a universalized outline of a 
person, that is, ‘the figure of’. Thus, Chakrabarty invokes and problematizes the ‘figure of 
the peasant’ (2000: 11); the ‘Indian’ as a ‘figure of lack’ (2000: 32); the figures of both the 
‘labourer/worker’ and ‘capitalist’ (2000: 56–7); the figure of ‘the subaltern’ (2000: 94); the 
‘figure of the suffering widow’ (2000: 118); and the figure of ‘the housewife … as distinct  
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from the figure of the officegoer’ (2000: 168). Figuring calls on both the one and the many 
at the same time, a generic individual and an imagined community, suggesting the 
possibility that one outline may stand in for some imagined whole without ever being 
required to make good on this promise. 
It is worth noting that Chakrabarty almost exclusively uses the word ‘figure’ to refer to 
people or perhaps bodies. Consequently, it is of interest that the Europe he seeks to 
decentre or provincialize is itself defined as a ‘figure’. This Europe is  
“an imaginary figure that remains deeply embedded in clichéd and shorthand forms in 
some everyday habits of thought that invariably subtend attempts in the social 
sciences to address questions of political modernity in South Asia.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 
4, italics in original) 
Thus, Chakrabarty's Europe has shape and form; it is abstracted while retaining particular 
characteristics; it is a body, an interloper, which embeds itself in everyday habits of 
thought. For Chakrabarty this process of figuring is part of the ‘Europe’ upon which he 
draws and is seeking to provincialize. The figure of the European child, however, is never 
rendered visible or problematized in Provincializing Europe. Rather, as we argue below, 
this particular figure is a haunting yet unquestioned presence in Chakrabarty's writing on 
Indian citizenship. 
Central to Chakrabarty's thesis is the idea of historicism. He refers to this as a ‘conceptual 
gift of nineteenth-century Europe’, one that is ‘integral to the idea of modernity’ and, 
therefore, needs to be engaged with and rethought (Chakrabarty 2000: 6). Historicism is an 
ideology of progress or development, a story which assumes a universal linear trajectory of 
history and where onwards is upwards. For Chakrabarty it is figured as a story of ‘first in 
Europe, then elsewhere’. In this way historicism is a particular form of that process of 
figuring discussed above, where that which occurred in Europe may be abstracted and 
rendered recognizable elsewhere, be that capitalism, modernity or Enlightenment, to use 
Chakrabarty's examples (2000: 7). The word ‘first’ again calls on the idea of the one and 
the many, but also now with the idea of inherent temporal ordering. Here, a singular ‘first’ 
event becomes programmatic and the pattern by which ‘second’ and ‘third’ instances of 
the same now-known event may be recognized elsewhere. A European history of ‘firsts’ 
can be constructed from which ‘signs’ may be elicited, allowing other instances elsewhere 
(non-European) to be recognized and placed along the trajectory of an already known 
stagist history. 
Within European colonialism, this historicism was called upon to particular effect. As 
Chakrabarty argues, it ‘came to non-European peoples in the nineteenth century as 
somebody's way of saying “not yet” to somebody else’ (2000: 8). Classic examples, cited by 
Chakrabarty, are John Stuart Mill's  
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articles ‘On Liberty’ and ‘On Representative Government’. A vociferous opponent of strong 
paternalism, Mill nevertheless suggested that Indians and Africans could not self-govern as 
they were ‘not yet’ civilized enough (see also Nandy 1987). They needed preparation 
through civilizing education and patient waiting through development under colonial rule 
before they would be ready to rule themselves. Self-control demonstrated by waiting 
under rule would, in time, be admitted as evidence of readiness for self-government. 
Chakrabarty writes, ‘Mill's historicist argument thus consigned Indians, Africans and other 
“rude” nations to an imaginary waiting room of history’ (2000: 7). It was a powerful 
metaphor. Furthermore, in drawing on the language of education and development it was 
not simply the waiting room of history to which colonized people were consigned, but also 
to a classroom. 
Edward Said outlines this in Orientalism:  
“So far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an 
assumption had been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently 
inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West. The Orient was viewed as if 
framed by the classroom.” (Said 1978: 40–1) 
Admittedly, the classroom is not the only frame that was used, but it is a significant one 
because of the way in which it invokes certain roles – Orient as pupil/child/student and 
West as teacher/parent/tutor. Thus the child–adult binary within colonial discourse, 
outlined previously, could be inscribed more specifically as a benign, paternalistic child–
parent, pupil–teacher relationship within the colonial imaginary. In this way, the modern 
child and its parent or tutor formed ‘the stock in trade of colonizing ideology’ (Kleinig 
1983: 170). Indeed, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ‘politicians and political apologists 
relied on familial imagery in characterizing the British Empire and rationalizing its 
impositions on subject peoples’ (Kleinig 1983: 170). While the classroom analogy is not 
rendered explicit in Chakrabarty's writings, the teacher–pupil binary is implied in his 
discussion of the language of development, civilization, education and waiting under 
colonial rule. This sets up the relationship between colonized and colonizers in parallel 
with the figure of the child and its specific relation to parental rule, a child that required 
socialization and was to ‘grow up’ through developmental stages. Thus the historicism of 
the waiting room is couched in the language and practice of infantilization. 
The Paradoxical Presence of the European Child 
Chakrabarty demonstrates that after Indian independence in 1947, this infantilizing 
historicism was rejected in the way in which enfranchisement  
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was enacted. Indian democracy, it was decided, would be based on ‘universal adult 
franchise’ and breaking out of the waiting room (and, indeed, of the classroom): ‘every 
Indian adult is treated practically and theoretically as someone already endowed with the 
skills of making a major citizenly choice, education or no education’ (Chakrabarty 2000: 
10). The story of modernity in India is, therefore, less a story of linear progression from a 
traditional society to a modern one, and more a complex entanglement of modernity and 
tradition. In European Enlightenment thought, peasants could not become citizens without 
first being educated. Thus, basic rights to education in Britain preceded universal suffrage 
by almost fifty years. In contrast, in India, peasants became citizens on independence 
despite being largely illiterate. This countered imperial notions of colonized subjects being 
‘not yet ready’ for universal human rights on the grounds that they were illiterate. 
This brings us to the paradox at the heart of this notion of citizenship. The paradox 
revolves around a question concerning the limits of enfranchisement: in what way could 
the franchise be said to be universal if it was qualified by the word ‘adult’. This seems to 
suggest that one may say ‘now’ to the Indian adult but ‘not yet’ to the Indian child, who 
does in fact remain left in the waiting room. This raises a further question concerning the 
basis for this decision. It cannot be that the Indian child is insufficiently educated, for the 
argument is that the Indian adult does not need to ‘grow up’ or wait under the rule of 
another; irrespective of education he or she may make a ‘major citizenly choice’. What 
discursive slippage allows for children to be excluded from the effect of these arguments? 
And why are children not considered to be endowed with the skills that adults somehow 
(but not through education) come at the age of majority to possess? In raising these 
questions we are not claiming that Indian children should necessarily have been 
enfranchised (see Semashko 2004); rather that the basis of their exclusion is neither 
justified nor made explicit. Our argument is that while, on the one hand, as Chakrabarty 
demonstrates, Indian notions of democracy and citizenship in 1947 challenged the 
supposed universality of European models, on the other hand, they were still based on 
universal distinctions between adult and child as a means for determining the limits of 
citizenship. This normative figure of the child, who is not yet qualified for citizenship and, 
therefore, remains disenfranchised, is as much in evidence in India in 1947 as it is in 
Europe. 
Indian notions of citizenship deliberately challenged the view of the figure of the peasant, 
or of the Indian in general, as a figure of lack. They rejected and refuted the construction 
of the Oriental as ‘irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, “different”’, which enabled the 
European to be constructed as ‘rational, virtuous, mature, “normal”’ (Said 1978: 40). Yet 
the argument worked by asserting that the Indian man or woman is an adult too like the 
colonial ruler and does not need to prove him or herself in order to be a  
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citizen and to self-govern. This, however, leaves in place and intact the particular set of 
(oppositional) divisions and distinctions between adult and child that were long at work in 
the colonial imaginary. The child remains defined by the same series of lacks that had been 
levelled at the Oriental: an ‘immature, irrational, incompetent, asocial and acultural child’ 
who must be turned into ‘a mature, rational, competent, social and autonomous adult’ 
(Heywood 2001: 3). Chakrabarty recognizes that such divisions and distinctions between 
adult and child vary and may be differently conceived. For example, in his discussion of 
John Locke's essay on ‘civil government’ (Chakrabarty 2000: 230–2), he argues that 
‘reason’ cannot begin to work until parental (that is, paternal) political authority – which is 
the authority to punish – ceases to exist. He recounts Locke's argument that reasoned 
human beings are autonomous adults and that parental/paternal authority is temporary. 
This authority helps children acquire reason through education, but the parental/paternal 
political authority must cease for the fraternal contract to become operational. 
Chakrabarty draws on Carol Pateman's point in The Sexual Contract that the Lockean story 
of the death of the father's authority was also the myth of modern patriarchy in the 
Christian West, in which the formal equality of all humans is predicated on the actual 
equality of brothers. Chakrabarty then argues that this death of parental authority is never 
imagined as part of the Bengali fraternal compact. Instead, the capacity to command 
belongs to the parents and specifically the male ancestral line, with no age limits: ‘Political 
authority in this modernity was modelled on parental authority, which never ceased to be’ 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 231). This parental authority, however, was not the absolute power of 
Lockean philosophy, but was based in devotion and adoration of the child for the father. 
Chakrabarty performs a subtle dismantling of the supposedly universal fraternal contract 
that underpins patriarchal liberalism. However, his argument still rests upon another 
universal: the figure of the child. The ways in which both historicism and modern political 
thought informed and were informed by a particular European vision of child and adult 
remain unacknowledged and unchallenged. While the logic of the ideology of development 
is challenged fundamentally in Provincializing Europe, it does not proceed to dismantle the 
symbolic structure that this logic supports. Thus:  
“[In] the developmentalist model: childhood in relation to adulthood mirrors the 
primitive in relation to the civilized and the modern, the primate in relation to the 
properly human.” (Archard 1993: 35) 
Or, to reiterate Gagen's (2007) argument, children everywhere are universally barbarized. 
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Although this essay is not concerned directly with recounting historiographies of Indian 
notions of childhood per se, it is worth acknowledging this historiography as a means for 
understanding the adult–child binary at work in Indian citizenship. Between the 1850s and 
the 1930s, childhood in India was reinterpreted in the cultural and intellectual context of 
colonialism, and the ‘new children’ that emerged were deployed in various ways within 
colonialist and nationalist projects (Sen 2004; see also Kakar 1978). There were clear 
political strategies for delineating childhood by middle-class, nationalist Indians who were 
simultaneously challenging colonial institutions and the denial of citizenship, while 
responding to the demands of modernity. They reconstructed childhood as ‘the 
embodiment of a universal individuality’ (Sen 2005: 6). There were thus contradictory 
discourses of conflict with and accommodation of European universals at work in Indian 
articulations of how children should be treated by adults and the postcolonial state. The 
point we wish to make is that Chakrabarty's critique of the infantilizing effects of 
historicism, and of the teleology of stagist and developmental narratives, may not only be 
employed in his project of provincializing European notions of citizenship and modernity. 
His concern with provincializing Europe may also be employed in provincializing the figure 
of the European child, the figure that was mobilized in justifying colonial subjugation. 
Acknowledging the historiography of Indian childhood, and the multiple childhoods that 
Indians invoked for political purposes, provides but one means of provincializing this 
figure. 
Provincializing the European Child 
That the figure that was so connected with the paternalistic ‘not yet’ historicism of colonial 
Europe has been left intact while the historicism which informs such a vision of the child is 
challenged and rejected is both provocative and significant. How then might Chakrabarty's 
project be extended to provincialize the European child? Working through some of the 
lines of thought, which provide an outline of this figure, we trace the nature of the 
European child in its appearance in the colonial imaginary, consider briefly further 
examples of the ways in which colonized peoples constructed childhood, and draw out 
some of the implications of this. 
It is difficult in tracing the figure of the modern European child to avoid the influence of 
Philippe Ariès, writer of L'Enfant et la vie familial sous l'Ancien Régime (1960), translated as 
Centuries of Childhood (1962). Ariès offers a history that suggests that the concept of 
childhood is a specific awareness of what distinguishes children from adults, that this was 
not a feature of previous societies and is, in fact, distinctively modern and rooted  
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in the bourgeois cultures of Europe. This concept of childhood emerges in Europe in the 
mid-eighteenth century and ‘is manifested in morally appropriate forms of treatment, 
chiefly a certain separation of the worlds of child and adult’ (Archard 1993: 20). 
Ariès' work is often acknowledged as significant for the way in which it relativized the 
concept of childhood (James et al. 1998: 4). However, it has also been much criticized. 
Pertinently for this discussion, one of the charges has been that it is based in the same 
historicism and narrative of ‘first in Europe, then elsewhere’, which Chakrabarty challenges 
(Archard 1993: 23). This view of history places the ‘modern’ concept of childhood as 
superior and its acceptance as a sign of progress. In responding to this view, Archard 
distinguishes between ‘the concept of childhood which requires that children be 
distinguishable from adults in respect of some unspecified set of attributes and a 
conception of childhood as a specification of those attributes’ (Archard 1993: 23, italics in 
original). He argues on this basis that Ariès presumes that having the modern conception 
of childhood is to have the concept of childhood (no other conceptions need apply). 
Further, in the face of contradicting evidence it does not appear tenable to hold that 
earlier societies lacked a concept of childhood, simply that they had a different one 
(Archard 1993: 23). 
While the notion of childhood as a modern European ‘bourgeois invention’ seems 
unsustainable, it is possible to argue that it was a bourgeois conception of childhood that 
was universalized in the figure of the European child that is assumed in debates about 
democracy, citizenship and political modernity more broadly. In making this point, we also 
acknowledge two further points. First, the figure of the European child, for all its pretence 
of temporal universality, is constructed from more than one source and different lines of 
thought may (or may not) be called upon. In this way the figure may appear both fluid 
(drawing on multiple, seemingly interchangeable, lines of thought) and yet at times very 
clearly defined (when certain lines of thought are called upon to take shape). That such 
figuring draws on multiple sources and even different (and at times contradictory) lines of 
thought is also evidenced in Sara Ahmed's (2000, 2004) work on the multiple discourses 
that purport to make knowable the figure of the stranger, the international terrorist, or the 
asylum seeker. 
Second, such figures are not easily displaced by confounding evidence. For example, 
experiences of childhood differ by and between whatever categories one may think of: sex, 
gender, age, stage, ethnicity, religion, class, sexuality, nationality, dis/ability and so on 
(Holloway and Valentine 2000: 1). However, this is inconsequential with respect to figuring 
because, as discussed, a figure is claimed to present some abstracted, essential 
characteristic that transcends other differences. In drawing attention in what follows to 
some of the inheritances that form the threads of a modern (European) conception  
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of the child, this conception should not be taken as reified and singular. Nor should this 
imply that any conception acts determinatively and alone to define and structure the 
relationship of any one child and adult. Further, it is not our intention to occlude the ways 
in which difference may be treated differently, but to point out that this is precisely what 
the figuring of a European child does. 
James et al. (1998) offer a typology of such threads of thought about children. They refer 
to these lines of thinking as ‘pre-sociological’, arguing that they pre-date the sociological 
model, which takes childhood as an object of study itself rather than as subsumed in some 
other area of interest, such as family or schooling (1998: 22). Their book-length schema is 
detailed and worth citing at length, which we attempt to do through a play on the rhyme 
of the Victorian parlour game ‘The Minister's Cat’. This allows us subsequently to reveal 
the ways in which specific lines of thought informed the colonial imaginary (the numbers 
that follow each section refer to pages in James et al. (1998)).  
The pre-sociological child is the evil child – base and corrupt bearing original sin (10). 
What must be done? (Something must always be done!) Discipline and punish, wills 
to be broken, restrain the child from dangerous places (10–11). 
The pre-sociological child is the innocent child – angelic, uncorrupted by an evil world 
(13). 
What must be done? Celebrate their natural goodness and clarity of vision lost or 
forgotten by adults, satisfy their particular needs, give their desires room and protect 
their rights. Parents must be competent to do this (13–14). 
The pre-sociological child is the immanent child – vital and charged with potential, 
citizens in the making (15). 
What must be done? Reason with and teach them, recognize their capacity and lead 
them on to knowledge through experience (15–16). 
The pre-sociological child is the naturally developing child – growing up is progress 
through stages (17). 
What must be done? Nothing (except to measure, grade, rank, assess and intervene 
should someone be backward or shows signs of arrested development/ 
underdevelopment) (19). 
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The pre-sociological child is the unconscious child – not future's promise but adult's 
pasts (20). 
What must be done? Go back, go back, for the cause of aberrant adult behaviour lies 
in childhood, a childhood of unfinished business or becoming. 
Demonstrating how these lines of thought gave shape to the figure of the European child 
requires examples of how they appear in the colonial imaginary and connecting each of 
these children with particular writers and traditions (who are often seen as their 
progenitors). 
The evil child is regularly connected with the doctrine of Adamic original sin, the Dionysian 
mythology and the writer Thomas Hobbes, with his views on the absolute power of the 
monarch over the populace and by analogy of parents over children (James et al. 1998: 10–
11). This idea of a child's self-will being controlled and the need to protect the child from 
harm through discipline is in evidence in the writings of Lord Cromer, England's fin-de-
siècle representative in Egypt. Cromer invokes the language of depravity (a fallen state), of 
Orientals as ‘inveterate liars’, and the need for their judgement and discipline (Said 1978: 
39–41). As part of the civilizing project this view is sometimes seen as legitimizing brutality: 
‘the need for violence is seen in the inner waywardness of the child, a waywardness that 
needs to be curbed if the child is to be brought to civilization’ (Kleinig 1983: 171). 
The innocent child stands in stark contrast to the idea of the evil child and is often 
connected with Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Émile, and the idea of the free and noble savage 
(James et al. 1998: 13–14). This may be seen in the Orient's depiction as exotic locale, as 
sublime (Said 1978: 118–19), where people are represented as close to nature and 
following a more anthropological mode fêted as living a life of pre-industrialized 
innocence, unmarked and untainted by the smoky blackness of the ‘machine-age’. 
The immanent child is commonly connected with John Locke, the idea of the tabula rasa 
and that all knowledge comes from experience, but that the mental processes and 
perception needed to learn already exist (James et al. 1998: 16). This theme is perhaps less 
in evidence in the colonial imaginary, but can be traced in various discourses. For example, 
it is apparent in Mill's argument that ‘universal teaching must precede universal 
enfranchisement’ (in Chakrabarty 2000: 9). It is also apparent in the argument that every 
Indian adult was already endowed with the skills of making major citizenly choices. The 
distinction between acquired knowledge and ability to learn is much debated (James et al. 
1998: 6); perhaps this offers a reason why this line of thought is not picked up more and, 
where it might be said to appear, it does so in complex and contradictory ways. 
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The naturally developing child is most obviously influenced by historicism and is connected 
with Jean Piaget's understanding of childhood as progress through a universal, 
standardized and inevitable programme of developmental stages (James et al. 1998: 17). 
One example is the language of ‘developing’ and ‘uneven development’ (Chakrabarty 
2000: 7, 12) and ‘underdevelopment’ (Shohat and Stam 1994: 140). This parallels Piaget's 
naturally developing child, where the infantilization trope is projected onto a group or 
geographic area such as the ‘Third World’, which is said to need the guidance of more 
‘grown up’ or ‘advanced’ societies (Shohat and Stam 1994: 140). Furthermore, the use of 
the language of backwardness (Said 1978: 35) and progression fits into this story of the 
primitive first taking to its feet and a toddler taking its first steps (Archard 1993: 35). One 
example is Balfour's description of Egypt's rise ‘from the lowest pitch of social and 
economic degradation’ through colonization (in Said 1978: 35). 
Finally, the unconscious child is associated with Sigmund Freud, who argued that elements 
of personality, stages of development and complexes are the childhood building blocks 
that sustain the architecture of an adult psychopathology (James et al. 1998: 19). As a 
more recently articulated conception than others, this line of thought appears less in the 
colonial imaginary. However, it can be said to find expression in views that were influenced 
by the developmentalism of Piaget and the romanticism of Rousseau, suggesting that 
engaging with the Orient was to see one's own past: ‘the Other’ living like ‘we’ once did. 
The unconscious child as adult's past, not future's promise, is perhaps more clearly seen in 
the anticolonial writing of Frantz Fanon (1967, 1982) and the engagement by postcolonial 
scholars, Chakrabarty among them, with the haunting legacy of colonial discourse 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 252). 
Having laid out this survey of lines of thought and illustrated the ways in which different 
lines of thought appear in constituting the figure of the child in the colonial imaginary, 
more general comments may be made. When one reads that ‘the Oriental is … childlike’ 
(Said 1978: 40), or reflects on Chakrabarty's use of educative and developmental language, 
a particular configuration of the conception of the child is called upon. Yet, who is it that 
functions as ‘the universal child’ against which to measure or compare the Orient or 
anything or anyone else? Of course, this is a composite and so it becomes valuable to ask 
of what (and from where) is ‘the child’ of the colonial imaginary called upon by colonialists, 
anticolonialists or postcolonial theorists composed? This figure is not fixed or singular, but 
draws its shape from one or more lines of thought, and even here the lines are less distinct 
than we have suggested above. The trope of the universal ‘child’ then is not fixedly unitary, 
but complex and multiple. 
Historiographies of childhood in the colonial world reveal further complexity, and also the 
political compulsions that underpinned constructions of  
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childhood. As we have suggested, childhood was reinterpreted in the cultural and 
intellectual context of colonialism and deployed in various ways within both colonialist and 
anticolonialist projects. British observers, for example, asserted that European 
assumptions about age and childhood were inappropriate in India: ‘Indians did not become 
“children” or “adults” at the ages at which Europeans did, and juvenile delinquents, in 
particular, seemed to acquire the marks of adulthood early in life’ (Sen 2005: 67). In this 
same context, Indian elites shaped their own binaries between children and adults that 
were only partially derivative of, and in some cases actively rejected, colonial binaries 
(Kahn 1979; Nandy 1987). As a means of challenging the colonial denial of childhood status 
to Indian juveniles in order to criminalize them, and as a means of decolonizing the 
institutions of childhood, elite parents, writers and educators appropriated ‘the modern 
moulds within which the recovered child could be placed’ (Sen 2005: 2). They thus 
responded to British critiques of native degeneracy by seeking to ‘reconstruct the child … 
as repository of imperilled, premodern and essential Indian pasts that might be 
regenerated in the colonial present’. In asserting an Indian childhood, Indian elites also 
accommodated European bourgeois notions of childhood, since these were the tools 
available through which to decolonize the institutions of childhood. By drawing attention 
to particular conceptions of the child and showing how this inheritance is manifested in 
the colonial imaginary, we have laboured to show that the child called upon is not the 
reified figure of an Indian or Egyptian child, but a European child constructed in 
relationship with various Others. The case of India also exemplifies the ways in which this 
figure was appropriated, contested and decolonized by anticolonial elites. We have not 
suggested that the European child of the colonial imaginary is a product of a hermetically 
sealed Europe and then transported elsewhere, for this denies the possibility of coevalness 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 8) and returns to the ‘Europe first, elsewhere thereafter’ story of 
historicism. Instead, the child of which Said speaks and Chakrabarty invokes through his 
familial imagery bears the burden of European thought and history. To provincialize the 
European child is in part to recognize that burden. Moreover, we wish to argue that 
provincializing the European child raises a number of important ethical issues. 
Why Provincialize the European Child? 
To provincialize the European child is to recognize (along similar lines to Chakrabarty) both 
the indispensability and insufficiency of the European child to thinking about childhood 
anywhere its burden is felt. Different lines of thought about the child, as in our rhyme 
based on James et al. (1998), lead to particular pronouncements about what must be 
done, for the sake of  
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the child or the future of the nation, since the two are frequently tied together 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 224). Therefore, while some of the conceptions of childhood invoke 
the necessity of spatial separation, or even segregation, not all do. As we have indicated 
earlier, these figures are not determinative although they may go some way to constituting 
the everyday lives of children. In what follows, we offer some brief examples to illustrate 
why problematizing the (unhelpful) work done by the figure of the European child might 
be significant. 
The most obvious point is that the European child is not merely located in colonial 
discourses, but persists in contemporary representations. For example, humanitarian 
appeals and development discourses often use images of children. These are persuasive 
and emotive, implying that all children share the same attributes and needs, appealing to 
supposed universal aspects of the condition of childhood. As Erica Burman (1995: 22) 
argues, while children's rights in much of the world are in need of promotion and 
protection, such images are problematic and contradictory: ‘children are typically 
abstracted from culture and nationality to connote such qualities as innocence, and the 
quintessential goodness of humankind untainted by the cruel, harsh contaminating world’. 
The binary between innocence/goodness and experience/contamination is a product of 
the specific European philosophical legacies discussed above. The representation of lone 
black children in aid appeals works to pathologize their families and cultures, blaming the 
latter for failing to fulfil their duties to protect and care for these children (Holland 1992). 
Thus, colonial legacies blend into humanitarian concern, where in order to qualify for 
‘help’ parents in poorer countries are either invisible or infantilized themselves as 
incapable (Burman 1995). 
Development discourses also tend to globalize middle-class northern agendas by invoking 
the figure of the universalized European child, who is taken to stand for all children 
everywhere, often with unintended consequences. Although UNICEF does not necessarily 
define the child in universal terms (defined as any human being under the age of 18, 
except in countries where an earlier age of majority is recognized in law), its programmes 
have at times met with criticism. One well documented criticism, for example, concerned 
UNICEF's rights-based approach to child welfare during the 1990s and beyond (Horton 
2004). This approach drew on the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which defines a 
set of universal rights for children everywhere. However, in focusing on rights – based on 
western liberal values concerning the nature of childhood – UNICEF was accused of putting 
lower emphasis on child survival and mortality, with the consequence that attention and 
resources were diverted away from escalating child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa and 
parts of South and East Asia (Horton 2004). 
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Child labour is also an example of an issue driven by northern ethical concerns rather than 
by certain southern realities. Ethical and fair trade codes that prevent children from formal 
employment may, in fact, increase the financial insecurity experienced by some 
households. This is especially problematic where there is a high proportion of child-headed 
households, for example, in parts of sub-Saharan Africa where the adult population has 
been decimated by HIV-AIDS. To survive, children are often forced to work in less visible 
and unregulated areas of the informal sector because of restrictions barring their entry to 
formal, more heavily regulated sectors of the economy. In addition, fair trade often works 
with smallholder producers, many of whom depend on familial labour at key points in the 
production cycle, such as at harvest time. The restrictions on child labour thus ignore its 
potential significance in the economies of poor households and communities. Some 
charitable schemes (for example, child sponsorship schemes) also place restrictions on the 
sponsored child performing paid or unpaid labour, which might prevent their exploitation 
within formal and informal economies and help keep them in school, but also ignores their 
potential significance within the household economy. The exploitation of child labour 
throughout the world certainly requires attention, but also sophisticated locally specific 
responses rather than blanket bans to appease northern charities and consumers. 
Furthermore, the idealization of the European child also conveniently ignores the fact that 
children in the North work – for payment in the case of newspaper rounds, for example; 
within family enterprises; as carers within households. The consequences of initiatives in 
the cause of the ethical, but articulated around an unproblematized, idealized, universal 
European child, may have unethical consequences, not least in obfuscating the workings of 
global and national capital regimes by problematizing child labour in specific ‘Third World’ 
sites (Chowdhry 2002). 
It becomes clear that it is one thing to identify a bourgeois conception of childhood, with 
its vision of the separation of the worlds of adult and child. It is quite another to explore 
the ways in which this vision is and is not worked through in the lived experiences of 
individuals, families and communities, which might differ according to class, gender, 
location and so forth. Separations according to space may be compounded in multiple 
ways as much by a division of child–adult as women–men, colonized–colonizer and so on. 
While there is a danger in an essay of this kind that so much focus is given to the figure of 
the European child that particular children's experiences are occluded, such an 
engagement can both put in place (provincialize) and open up different ways of knowing 
the world. This is important not least because colonial attitudes about childhoods in 
postcolonial contexts have not disappeared. Nieuwenhuys (2009) argues, for example, that 
the idea of understanding children's upbringing in India is considered of value only for the 
purpose of eradication and reform continues  
  
131 
 
to inform most research on Indian childhood today. The value of provincializing is in 
looking again at childhood in India or the UK, for example, and in asking profound 
questions about how to make sense of the burden of the thought inherited, but also ‘how 
this thought may be renewed from and for the margins’ (Chakrabarty 2000: 16). 
Conclusions 
This essay has drawn attention to the unacknowledged figure of the universalized 
European child that is present within critiques of European discourses that infantilized, and 
still infantilize, the Other. It has argued that even in Chakrabarty's Provincializing Europe, 
one of the most significant critiques of Eurocentrism and of universalizing European 
norms, the figure of the European child remains an unacknowledged, undeconstructed and 
unproblematized presence. In explaining the significance of India's rejection of infantilizing 
colonial depictions of its peoples as citizens, Chakrabarty still leaves untouched the 
universal adult–child binary that provided the basis for India's delimitation of citizenship 
and the denial of enfranchisement to children. In pointing out this paradox, we suggest 
that it also opens up the need to provincialize the European child that is positioned at 
times at the heart of Chakrabarty's and other critiques of colonial and neocolonial 
discourse. We have suggested that this figure of the European child is never singular, but 
rather draws on multiple ideas of childhood that bear the burden of different European 
inheritances. Moreover, historiographies of childhood in the colonial world (e.g. Sen's 
studies of India) reveal the agency of the colonized in constructing multiple childhoods that 
both appropriated and contested the figure of the European child. Perhaps most 
significantly, this figure is also repeatedly invoked in problematic ways in contemporary 
discourses that may have unintended and unethical consequences. The figure of the 
universal European child thus continues to do (unhelpful) work; problematizing its 
presence means provincializing, which is not the same as abandoning a notion of childhood 
around which to advocate for children's rights and wellbeing everywhere, but an opening 
up of possibilities for rethinking the figure of the child. This rethinking also raises further 
ethical considerations. 
This essay is certainly not the first to ask questions of how the figure of the child, or 
childhood more generally, might be thought about differently. Arguably the sociology of 
childhood (as distinguished from the pre-sociological models) is a history of attempts to do 
just this (James et al. 1998). Here it is increasingly common for children to be positioned as 
social actors or social agents rather than figures of lack, or defined only in  
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opposition to adults (James and James 2004: 25), though this risks replacing one 
universalizing narrative with another and occluding the multiple roles and positions 
different children occupy. Others, as part of their reflection on work with children (e.g. 
Cope 2009), write about their own personal attempts to think differently about childhoods 
and to note the conceptual inheritances with which they labour. One immediate 
implication is that since definitions of adult and child have been oppositional, a rethinking 
of the figure of the child would also entail a rethinking of the figure of the adult. This could 
mean admitting that adults may in fact retain something of the dependency, and perhaps 
also immaturity, irrationality and incompetence that had been previously ascribed solely to 
children (Heywood 2001: 3). For those who pride themselves on (and derive authority by 
their claims to) maturity, rationality, competence and autonomy this would be a radical 
departure. A strong child–adult binary offers a kind of protection from intervention or 
interference and a means of rejecting many kinds of external authority, as well as a means 
through which to assert authority. Therefore, while deconstructing the child–adult binary 
may challenge adult privilege it may also make some adults and children more vulnerable. 
Furthermore, if as Archard (1993: 35) suggests, there is a symbolic structure that presents 
equivalences between childhood–adulthood, primitive–civilized and primate–human, to 
deconstruct one is to go some way towards deconstructing the others. As the implications 
– both ethical and material – of this are broadly unclear, it is perhaps appropriate to 
conclude with this note of caution. 
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